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Abstract
Islamic banks create an interest in their own right as a rising branch in financial
intermediation, particularly in the post-crisis era. In addition, they also deserve the
attention of students of Islamism due to their possible connection with Islamic
movements. Through a comparison of Islamic and conventional banking, we analyze
themotivations and behavior of Islamic economic actors who determine the cash flow
to Islamic banks. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to popular views that portray
these actors as ideologues or financiers of radical Islam, they have pragmatic
motivations and may adapt to liberal systems in order to seize economic incentives.
Keywords: Islamic finance; liberalism; bank lending channel; monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.
The rise of Islamic banking creates an interest in its own right as a rising
branch in financial intermediation, particularly in the post-crisis era.1 At the
same time, it also merits attention from students of Islamism due to its
possible connections with Islamic movements. In addition, economic
behavior’s suitability for empirical analysis allows us to bring new empirical
evidence to the popular but rather speculative debate on the motives of
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Islamic actors.2 A better understanding of the preferences of Islamic
economic actors, particularly the relative weight of religious and pragmatic
interests, can help to gauge the direction that Islamic movements might
take in certain contexts.
Our study of Islamic banks and their customers reveals important conclu-
sions about Islamic actors and challenges some dominant assumptions. First, in
contrast to popular views that consider Islamic economic actors as financiers of
radical Islam, we find that these actors have pragmatic motivations and may
adapt to liberal systems in order to seize economic incentives. Our findings also
contradict exceptionalist assumptions that portray Islamic actors as essentially
different, and particularly more ideological, than their counterparts. We find
that many Islamic actors pursue self-interest just as do their non-Islamic
counterparts, and they are open to reconsidering their behavior if the otherwise
preferable option becomes too costly. Finally, we argue that this finding has
political and economic implications, as it may reflect Islamic actors’ chances
to become part of liberal systems. If “rational” behavior is a prerequiste of
liberalism, as suggested by seminal studies such as that by Adam Przeworski,3
then one can argue that Islamic actors can satisfy this requirement.
The Islamic finance movement and its discontents
Modern Islamic banks were originally formed to solve the fiscal problems of
Islamic actors and thereby to help finance Islamic societies. Because earning
interest on cash balances—called riba in Arabic—is considered a major sin in
theMuslim faith, doing business with conventional banks constitutes a problem for
devoutMuslims. The inherent structure of Islamic banks, also called “participation
banks” (katılım bankası) in Turkey, is different from that of conventional banks.
Instead of taking deposits and issuing loans based on the principle of a pre-
determined interest rate, Islamic banks engage in partnerships where profits as well
as losses are shared with customers. Net profits generated as a result of lending
activities determine the profit shares offered on “participation accounts,” which are
an analogue to savings accounts in conventional banks.4 Islamic banks do not
extend direct loans to their borrowers, either.5 Financing takes place not by
2 With “Islamic actors,” we refer to individuals who prefer that Islamic principles and institutions shape
daily social, economic, and political life.
3 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4 Participation accounts typically take the form ofmudaraba contracts. In this type of contract, the bank
and the customer engage in a business venture where the customer is the depositor and the bank,
the mudarib, manages the money and shares any profits or losses with the customer.
5 Loans are often issued via mudaraba or murabaha contracts. In this type of mudaraba, the bank
becomes the creditor and the customer is themudarib, who is the worker or manager of the business
























issuing direct loans or charging interest, but rather in the form of a trade
agreement. Enabling devout individuals to earn money without interest, these
banks argue that they help to finance Islamic societies. Furthermore, they
suggest that they also contribute to the broader economic environment by
bringing new and otherwise idle capital into the market.
Islamic financial institutions arose chiefly in the 1970s, with the emergence
of the oil revenues of the Middle East. The increase in oil prices over the past
ten years and the economic rise of Asian Muslim nations contributed to the
growth of the Islamic financial sector. Islamic banks made another leap forward
following the global financial crisis that began in 2007. While conventional
banks holding “toxic” assets faced losses and subsequent shortages of liquidity,
Islamic banks remained immune to such problems because they stayed away
from such assets. Thus, Islamic banks became a preferable alternative not only
for Muslim investors wishing to avoid interest due to religious restrictions, but
also for other customers seeking alternative forms of investment.
Political factors, most particularly the rise of modern Islamic movements in
the Muslim world since the late 1970s, also played a critical role in the rise
of Islamic banks. The rise of Islamism undoubtedly created more demand
for Islamic economic investment alternatives. Under the circumstances, even
secular states such as Turkey or Malaysia promoted the Islamic banking sector,
not simply to respond to such demands, but also to send a political message to
Islamic constituencies and receive their support.6
The rise of Islamic banks has stimulated debates regarding their relation-
ship with Islamist movements, with skeptics suspecting that these banks
finance Islamic radicalism. In Turkey, such skeptics played an important
role in the military intervention against the coalition government led by the
pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in 1997. The military claimed
that this Islamist group in Turkey was pursuing an Islamic revolution, and that
Islamic banks were the main financiers.7 After the attack on the World
jointly owned with the bank.Murabaha is a more popular funding option where the bank purchases a
commodity that the customer wishes to purchase, with the payment going to the seller of the
commodity. The bank then resells the commodity to its customer for the original price plus a profit
margin, and the customer pays back his debt in installments.
6 For the Turkish case, see Filiz Başkan, “The Political Economy of Islamic Finance in Turkey,” in The
Politics of Islamic Finance, eds. Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2004), 216–239. For the Malaysian case, see Lena Rethel, “Global Ambitions, Local Realities: The
Everyday Political Economy of Islamic Finance in Malaysia” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association [APSA], Washington, DC, August 2014).
7 On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) sent a warning to the
government, led by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), claiming that it was deviating
from secularist principles. Following the government’s resignation, the MGK issued a list of Islamic
companies, among which Islamic financial institutions took the lead, arguing that these companies

























Trade Center on September 11, 2001, more observers started to
consider the political role played by Islamic financial institutions and their
customers. As Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson explain,8 in the
aftermath of the attacks, the United States government began portraying
Islamic banks as targets of the “war on terror” and attacking them legally
and financially. More recently, some influential studies have argued that
the Islamic finance movement does not challenge liberalism, but rather
creates a niche for itself within the liberal order.9 Similarly, studies
comparing Islamic and conventional financial institutions, such as that of
Laurent Weill, have suggested that Islamic financial institutions do not
enjoy a captive client base simply due to their Islamic character, but rather
they compete with conventional banks.10 In the same vein, recent research
on Islamic business groups has highlighted the key role of economic
interests, which may even supersede ideology, in shaping the political
and economic agenda of these actors.11 However, Islamic banks and
other financial insitutions still retain their “mystery” and are viewed with
suspicion not only in the West, but also in predominantly Muslim nations
such as Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia.
This paper provides a comparative analysis of Islamic and conventional
banking in Turkey, with a focus on individuals who are typically left out of the
literature. Our research applies a wide range of methods to new empirical
evidence in order to analyze the motivations and behavior of Islamic economic
actors who determine the cash flow to Islamic banks, as well as to assess the role
Islamic actors can play in economic and political life.
Analyzing the workings of the bank lending channel in Turkey, we examine
whether or not there are significant differences among Islamic and conventional
banks in response to a change in interest rate vis-à-vis the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. In this way, we investigate the behavioral patterns of Islamic
financial actors, whom we operationalize as the customers of Islamic banks.
Assembly of Turkey’s Commission for the Investigation of Military Interventions, particularly the
comments of Güneş Taner, the former Minister of the Economy; http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/
arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/ek10.pdf.
8 Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson, eds., The Politics of Islamic Finance (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2004).
9 Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); M. Omar Farooq, “Self Interest, Homo Islamicus and Some Behavioral
Assumptions in Islamic Economics and Finance,” International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking
and Finance 1, no. 1 (2011): 52–79.
10 Laurent Weill, “Do Islamic Banks Have Higher Market Power?” Comparative Economic Studies 53, no. 2
(2011): 291–306.
11 Seda Demiralp, “The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey,”
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We test whether these actors behave purely out of religious motivations, or if
they instead also respond to pragmatic interests that may contradict Islamic
principles. Our findings suggest that Islamic banks’ customers are at least as
sensitive to interest rate changes as the customers of conventional banks.
Coupled with the fact that Islamic banks are slower to adjust their rates of
return, we conclude that these banks are more vulnerable to interest rate
changes triggered by the monetary transmission mechanism relative to con-
ventional banks. An increase in interest rates due to tight monetary policy leads
to a slower increase in the profit shares distributed by Islamic banks and widens
the wedge between the rates of return offered by Islamic and conventional
banks. This leads to a decline in the sources of funds that are channeled to
Islamic banks, which is consistent with rational consumer behavior. As our
interviews with Islamic bank customers also demonstrate, devout individuals
prefer Islamic financing so long as it provides competitive economic advantages.
However, when other financial options become economically advantageous,
many individuals prefer those, despite their religious concerns. This finding
refutes certain general assumptions about Islamic actors, which is critical in
assessing the role they play in economic and political life. We suggest that,
despite the widely accepted beliefs in the literature, Islamic economic actors do
not behave primarily by fixed ideological motivations, although they may weigh
their ideological preferences against their economic interests and seek to bal-
ance them. As subsequent sections will explain, this flexibility has important
implications, as it suggests that these actors could adapt to liberal economic and
political systems that require compromise and pragmatism.
The curious case of Islamic banks: The Islamic bank as a “black box”?
The role of Islamic banking in world financial markets continues to increase.
This development creates a good deal of curiosity about these institutions, not
only among the public but also in academic circles in various fields, including
economics, Islamic law, and political science. Those studies whose broad
outlines are given below successfully described the functioning of these
institutions, the economic and religious needs that they met, or the political and
economic context that enabled, or sometimes challenged, their development.
Nevertheless, most of these studies focus on the banks as the main units of
analysis, rather than investigating the preferences and behavior of the indivi-
duals who do business with these institutions. As such, many studies have
portrayed Islamic banks as a “black box,” showing only their inputs and outputs
without examining the decision-making processes of the participating actors.
Examination of the motivations and choices of the individuals who shape

























is often lacking. Moreover, in many cases description has prevailed over ana-
lysis, and the lack of empirical evidence has prevented scholars from making
convincing claims about these economic actors.
Studies of Islamic banks are most prevalent in the economics literature and
typically analyze the economic advantages offered by these banks. They
describe the functioning of these newly founded institutions and consider
if they contribute to the economy.12 Such studies have compared Islamic
financial institutions with their conventional counterparts13 and ques-
tioned if Islamic banks offered more effective alternatives in certain cir-
cumstances, such as during financial crises,14 in agricultural economies,15
for small enterprises,16 or in reflecting the effects of monetary economic
regulations upon the economy.17 Others have considered whether Islamic
banks make a contribution to economic development by bringing into
the financial market the revenues of individuals who refuse to invest their
money in conventional banks or stocks.18 One important contribution of these
studies has been to highlight, albeit implicitly, that Islamic banks do not merely
respond to religious demands, but offer certain economic advantages that have
attracted customers. However, these studies have focused on the institutions
or financial sectors, rather than on the customers, and so they have provided
little in the way of insight into or evidence of actors’ preferences.
A parallel set of literature has developed in the area of Islamic studies
that investigates which type of contracts offered by these institutions
have performed better in serving Islamic goals (for instance, murabaha versus
12 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010);
Delwin A. Roy, “Islamic Banking,” Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 3 (July 1991): 427–56.
13 Karen Pfeifer, “Islamic Business and Business as Usual: A Study of Firms in Egypt,” Development in
Practice 11, no. 1 (2001): 20–33.
14 Thomas A. Timberg, Islamic Banking in Indonesia (Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth, 2000).
15 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islamic Banking and Credit Policies in the Sadat Era: The Social Origins of
Islamic Banking in Egypt,” Arab Law Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1985): 32–5; Badawi B. Osman, “The Experience
of the Sudanese Islamic Bank in Partnership (Musharakah) Financing as a Tool for Rural Development
among Small Farmers in Sudan,” Arab Law Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1999): 221–230.
16 Rodney Wilson, “Islamic Finance in Europe,” RSCAS Policy Papers 2007/02 (San Domenica de Fiesole:
European University Institute for Musmine, 2007), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/
7739/?sequence=1; Grahame J. Boocock and John R. Presley, “Equity Capital for Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises in Malaysia: Venture Capital or Islamic Finance,”Managerial Finance 19, no. 7 (1993):
82–95.
17 Salina H. Kassim and M. Shabri Abd. Majid, “Sensitivity of the Islamic and Conventional Banks to
Monetary Policy Changes: The Case of Malaysia,” Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance 2, no. 3/
4, (2009): 239–253; Raditya Sukmana and Salina H. Kassim, “Roles of the Islamic Banks in the Monetary
Transmission Process in Malaysia,” International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and
Management 3, no. 1 (2010): 7–19.
18 Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar, and Metin Toprak, “Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and
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mudaraba contracts), or to what extent these institutions contribute to Islamic
economies by collecting zakat,19 protecting small enterprises, or supporting
production.20 Some such studies have highlighted concerns arising from
the fact that Islamically more suitable contracts, such as mudaraba, have
not necessarily been more popular among the customers of Islamic
banks, who often prefer more questionable but economically advantageous
contracts, such as murabaha. These studies challenge the assumption
that Islamic banks always serve Islamic goals, but their impact has been
limited since they often remain normative and have very rarely employed
empirical analysis.
A substantive effort to better understand the motives and behavior of
Islamic economic actors has remained absent in political studies of Islamism as
well. Until recently, the limited amount of research into the politics of
Islamic finance has typically consisted of descriptive analyses explaining the
process of formation of Islamic financial institutions.21 This lack of interest
on the part of political scientists is unfortunate inasmuch as Islamic
financial actors can impact economic and political life in Muslim nations
due to the large sums of financial resources that they can control and
channel to Islamic political parties. Therefore, understanding the
preferences of these actors, the extent of their commitment to religious
principles, and their willingness to consider non-Islamic politico-economic
systems is critical to predicting the roles they may play in the politics of the
societies in which they operate.
Finally, in the past decade, particularly after the Al-Qaeda attack on the
World Trade Center in 2001, studies of the politics of Islamic finance have
proliferated as many observers came to view Islamic financial actors as
political agents.22 The United States government played a particularly
important role in portraying Islamic institutions as the financiers of
radical Islam and, therefore, targets of the “war on terror.”23 This reaction
increased political and academic interest in Islamic economic actors.
19 Zakat is an Islamic obligation for Muslims to distribute one-fortieth of their annual savings to the poor
as charity.
20 Saad Al-Harran, “Introduction: Cases in Islamic Finance,” Arab Law Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1999): 193–202;
Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Tarik Yousef, “Islamic Banks and Investment Financing”, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 32, no. 1 (February 2000): 93–120; Muhammad Anwar, “Islamicity of Banking and
Modes of Islamic Banking”, Arab Law Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 2003): 62–80.
21 For a successful example, see Sami Zubaida, “The Politics of the Islamic Investment Companies in
Egypt,” British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (1990): 152–161.
22 Also see Patrick Imam and Kangni Kpodar, “Islamic Banking: How Has it Diffused,” IMF Working Paper
WP/10/195, International Monetary Fund, 2010: 1–29, for the impact of the rise of oil prices, which
coincided with the Al-Qaeda attacks, on the diffusion of Islamic financial institutions.

























New and successful studies have developed to investigate the links between
Islamic political and financial groups, how Islamic finance impacts political
Islam and vice versa, and most importantly whether or not Islamic banks
finance Islamic fundamentalism.24 Some of these studies have examined
links between the managers of Islamic banks and Islamic political parties,25
while others have measured the activities of Islamic banks in regions
where Islamic parties are popular and studies the links between
the development of these banks and Islamic movements.26 Other studies
analyzed the winners (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood and similar
organizations as well as small merchants and industrialists) and losers
(e.g., the agricultural sector, large-scale entrepreneurs, and black market
currency traders) of this rising sector,27 the supportive or preventive roles
that governments play in the foundation of these institutions,28 and the
economic factors—such as the discovery of oil in the region, government
debt, or the transition to export-led growth—that contributed to
the rise of Islamic banks.29 While these studies have made important
contributions by highlighting the politics of the Islamic financial sector,
many of them remained focused on the financial institutions rather than on
the individuals who form them. However, the omission of Islamic actors as
units of analysis limits our understanding of the agency that shapes these
institutions. By focusing on the Islamic identity of the actors, observers
may miss the complexity of the decision-making, preference-ordering, and
adaptive strategies involved in these actors’ financial activities. As a result,
we still know too little concerning the motivations and behavior of
“homo Islamicus” and whether, and if so to what extent and in what ways,
he or she differs from homo economicus. Nevertheless, this difference
constitutes a critical issue in studies of Islamism, as the following section
will illustrate.
24 Ibid.; Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
25 Endtre Stiansen, “Interest Politics: Islamic Finance in the Sudan 1977–2001,” in The Politics of Islamic
Finance, 55–167.
26 Kristin Smith, “The Kuwait Finance House and the Islamization of Public Life in Kuwait,” in The Politics
of Islamic Finance, 168–190; and “Islamic Banking and the Politics of International Financial
Harmonization” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association [APSA], Chicago, 2004).
27 Abbashar Jamal, “Funding Fundamentalism: Sudan,” Review of African Political Economy 52 (1991):
103–109.
28 See Başkan, “The Political Economy” and Rethel, “Global Ambitions.”
29 Bjørn Olav Utvik, “Religious Revivalism in Nineteenth-Century Norway and Twentieth-Century Egypt:
A Critique of Fundamentalism Studies,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 17, no. 2 (2006): 143–157;
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“Rational actors” and religious commitments: Exceptionalism in
studies of Islamic actors
Islamic actors’ differences from their non-Islamic counterparts in terms of
economic, political, or social behavior constitutes an interest in many social
science disciplines. One particular focus of these inquiries is whether Islamic
individuals are driven primarily by religious doctrine or if they rather behave
according to universal motives, such as interest maximization. This question
has important political and economic implications, as theorists suggest that
pragmatic behavior constitutes a prerequisite for liberalism.
In his seminal work Democracy and the Market, Przeworski argued that
democratic liberal systems do not necessarily require individuals who truly
believe in liberal values, but they do require rational actors who pursue their
interests and who can be flexible and adapt to circumstances.30 These are
actors who are willing to bargain and who may settle with non-ideal
situations.31 Liberal systems are initiated by actors who seek to maximize
interests, and they consolidate over time as the actors start to actually
internalize and habituate democratic and liberal behavior.32 Thus, liberal
systems can be founded even without liberal participants, as long as there
are self-interested actors willing to reconsider their demands, order and
postpone some of them, and join partnerships with people who share
different beliefs. Ideologues, on the other hand, do not constitute prefer-
able participants for liberal systems in that they are difficult to negotiate
with and cling to their ideals, sometimes even at the cost of their lives.33
The neo-liberal turn of Islamic groups since the 1990s in Turkey, Egypt, and
elsewhere stimulated debates on the liberalization of Islamic groups. Some scholars
have argued that Islamists can adapt to non-Islamic systems, such as liberal
democracies, if some of their economic interests are harnessed.34 Some of these
studies compare Islamic moderation with the democratization of former
Communist parties in Europe and suggest that Islamists can follow the same
path.35 Nevertheless, other scholars have claimed that Islamic moderation is
30 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
31 Ibid., 26.
32 John Waterbury, “Democracy without Democrats: Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle
East,” in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan
Salame (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 23–47; Ghassan Salame, “Introduction: Where are
the Democrats?” in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed.
Ghassan Salame (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 1–22.
33 Waterbury, “Democracy without Democrats,” 23; Salame, “Introduction,” 2–3.
34 Seda Demiralp, “The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey,”
Comparative Politics 41, no. 3 (2009): 315–335.

























an oxymoron. Accordingly, Islamists’move towards liberalism in such places as
Turkey and Egypt can only be a tactic to survive and obtain power so as to
eventually overthrow non-Islamic institutions. Underlying this thought is the
assumption that Islamists are inherently fundamentalist actors.
The presumption that Islamic actors are different from other actors in being
driven primarily by religious doctrine retains a substantial place in the literature
on Islamism. Although challenged by critical studies, “Islamic exceptionalism”
continues to constitute an intellectual barrier in the study of Islamist actors and
movements.36 Exceptionalist accounts suggest that we cannot understand
Islamic actors with the general theoretical tools we have, because Islamic
actors, parties, and institutions are governed by unique (Islamic) principles.
One of the widely argued political implications of this view is that Islamic
actors cannot adapt to non-Islamic economic or political systems, such as
liberalism.37 According to such views, qualities like negotiation, adaptation,
interest calculation, pragmatism, and rational consumer behavior are widely
shared among non-Islamic or secularist groups, but they are not to be expected
from Islamists. These accounts tend to portray Islamic actors as ideologues
unable to be as flexible and pragmatic as their non-Islamic counterparts, and
who are thus incompatible with liberal economic or political systems. Finally,
it should be noted that the view of Islamic actors as substantially different
from their counterparts is not unique to secularist accounts, but can also be
observed among Islamic approaches. According to these accounts, an obser-
vingMuslim is primarily motivated to live an Islamic life and contribute to the
founding of an Islamic society. In this vein, Islamic accounts suggest that homo
Islamicus differs from homo economicus by preferring a moral economy over
pragmatic benefits.38 In sum, regardless of their ideological points of reference,
the dominant view of Islamic actors depicts them as individuals motivated
primarily to promote an Islamic society. Despite some critical studies, the
explanatory power of Islamic identity remains amplified in the literature in
the absence of sufficient counter-evidence.
Islamic banks and the lending channel
Our goal in this section is to investigate whether there are any quantifiable
differences in the customer behavior of conventional versus Islamic banks.
36 Michael C. Hudson, “The Middle East,” PS: Political Science and Politics 34, no. 4 (2001): 801–804; Eva
Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–157.
37 Sanford Lakoff, “The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004):
133–139.
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Specifically, we want to see how the balance sheet components of these two
types of banks change in response to a monetary policy action represented by an
interest rate change. The particular framework that we analyze is the bank
lending channel.
The monetary transmission mechanism depicts the alternative ways in
which changes in the monetary policy are transmitted to the rest of the econ-
omy. Since the 1980s, two broad transmission mechanisms have been discussed
in the macroeconomics literature: an interest-rate or money channel, in which
interest rates adjust to clear markets and influence borrowing and lending
behavior; and a credit channel, in which the quantity as much as the price of
loanable funds transmits monetary policy to the economy. Within the credit
channel literature, a narrow bank lending channel view suggests that changes in
the policy stance and the quantity of reserves directly affect the amount of
lending that banks can do.
The chain of events that constitutes the bank lending channel begins with a
change in the monetary policy stance. For the post-2005 period analyzed in this
paper, monetary policy actions can be captured by changes in interest rates,
which has been the operational instrument of the Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, TCMB) for that period.
Following, say, an increase in interest rates, the central bank drains reserves
from the system through open market sales. Assuming that it is costly for
banks to raise external funding in order to make up for the decline in their
reserves, banks reduce their loans. The inherent assumption in the bank
lending channel is that bank reserves are imperfect substitutes for external
funding. This assumption is particularly valid for countries such as Turkey,
where the financial system is less developed and alternative funding opportu-
nities are limited.39
In order to investigate the existence of the bank lending channel, we
focus on the balance sheet components of Islamic and conventional banks.
Specifically, we decompose bank liabilities into those that are subject to reserve
requirements (which are essentially demand deposits for conventional banks
and current accounts for Islamic banks) and those that are exempt from reserve
requirements (which are time deposits for conventional banks and participation
accounts for Islamic banks). According to the bank lending channel, a tight
monetary policy action that is represented by an interest rate hike leads to a
decline in reservable deposits, which in turn reduces bank loans.
A finding suggesting that the customers of Islamic banks remain indifferent
to changes in interest rates, and hence that there is no change in reservable
39 See Selva Demiralp, “Parasal Aktarım Mekanizmasında Para’nın Yeri: Türkiye İçin Bir Analiz,” İktisat,

























deposits, would support the argument that Islamic actors are not motivated by
economic interests, and this would imply that Islamic banks are not affected
by the bank lending channel. The opposite result, on the other hand, would
refute popular assumptions, illustrating that Islamic economic actors are
not essentially different from their counterparts. Therefore, our investigation
as to whether or not Islamic banks are affected by the lending channel has
one-to-one implications for the understanding of the economic choices of
Islamic actors.
The period following a monetary policy action constitutes a unique
opportunity for the purposes of our analysis investigating the extent of
religious motives in determining the behavior of Islamic bank customers. An
unanticipated change in monetary policy, such as an increase in interest rates,
constitutes a theoretical conflict for these individuals—albeit only briefly—
where they must choose between either remaining with Islamic banks or
switching elsewhere. This type of conflict is rare in practice, because normally
Islamic banks provide almost the same advantages that conventional banks do,
as the profit rates offered by Islamic banks generally match the interest rates
offered by conventional banks. However, during the brief periods immediately
after monetary policy actions, Islamic banks may become temporarily
less advantageous than conventional banks until they once again match their
profit rates with the interest rates. Thus, these periods of adjustment allow us
to observe how Islamic actors behave when faced with a dilemma between
religious and pragmatic preferences.
To that end, we estimate a monthly structural vector autoregression (VAR)
for Turkey. We conduct an impulse response analysis to measure the response
to a change in interest rates of both conventional and participation banks. We
use the following variables in the listed Cholesky order: interest rate; US
dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate; consumer price index (CPI); conventional
banks’ liquid assets; participation banks’ liquid assets; demand deposits of
conventional banks; current accounts of Islamic banks (i.e., the analogue of
conventional banks’ demand deposits); time deposits of conventional banks;
participation accounts of Islamic banks (i.e., the analogue of conventional
banks’ time deposits); loans of conventional banks; loans of Islamic banks;
and industrial production index. Most variables apart from policy rate are
seasonally adjusted using the Census X-13 method.40 This VAR follows the
general set-up established in the literature.41 Accordingly, monetary policy
40 Most of the data are publicly available at the TCMB’s website, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr. Summary
statistics for the series used in the analysis are available from the authors upon request.
41 Ben S. Bernanke and Alan Blinder, “The Federal Funds Rate and The Channels of Monetary
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is assumed to affect macroeconomic variables immediately, but is not itself
affected by them within the same month. There is a contemporaneous
spillover from the exchange rate to the inflation rate. This assumption is
consistent with the inherent structure of the Turkish economy, which
relies heavily on imported intermediate goods. Going back to the Cholesky
ordering, monetary policy affects bank liabilities contemporaneously,
which feeds into bank loans and hence industrial production.42
All variables except interest rates are in logarithmic form as a precaution
against non-stationarity.43 The data is monthly, expanding from December
2005 through March 2013. We use one lag in the VAR to conserve
degrees of freedom within a relatively short sample of 86 observations. This
lag specification is also supported by the Schwarz information criterion.44
As we look at bank liabilities, there are two sources of bank funding in the
model. The first source is demand deposits for conventional banks and current
accounts for participation banks, both of which have negligible returns for the
account holders and are subject to reserve requirements; that is, banks need to
hold a certain fraction of these deposits as reserves at the central bank. Instead
of monetary gains, depositors choose to hold these accounts for their liquidity
and convenience, such as the ability to make payments without carrying money.
The second source of funding is time deposits for conventional banks and
participation accounts for participation banks. The primary motivation for
holding these accounts is their monetary returns. According to the monetary
transmission mechanism, an increase in interest rates increases the opportunity
cost of non-interest bearing accounts (such as demand deposits and current
accounts) and leads to a decline in such accounts. Meanwhile, accounts with
positive returns (such as time deposits and participation accounts) increase
depending on the speed of adjustment of the rate of return on such accounts.
Figure 1 provides a comparative perspective of the relative magnitudes
of alternative sources of funding for conventional and participation banks.
42 The results are robust to alternative plausible Cholesky orderings, such as ordering bank loans prior to
bank liabilities (assuming that banks issue loans first and then obtain the funding), or placing the
industrial production index after CPI and prior to the balance sheet variables (assuming that changes
in bank loans do not affect industrial production contemporaneously).
43 Non-stationarity is a common challenge in macroeconomic analysis. Nevertheless, this is not
necessarily a problem so long as the residuals in the VAR are stationary. To address non-stationarity,
we take the logarithm of the nonstationary variables. Furthermore, we add one lag of each variable to
capture the persistence. The residuals from the VAR analysis are found to be stationary (not shown).
This finding supports the validity of our results despite non-stationary regressors.
44 Our results are robust when we incorporate two lags in the VAR. Adding an additional lag allows us to
eliminate any remaining correlation in the residual terms. Nevertheless, we prefer to report the


























The total sources of funding for conventional banks are an order of magnitude
larger than those of participation banks, reflecting the relative market shares of
the two types of banks. Indeed, as of December 2005, which is the beginning
of our sample, total demand deposits were about 25 times larger than those of
current accounts, while time deposits were about 28 times larger than partici-
pation accounts. The figure illustrates that, while all four channels of funding
increased over time, the gap between conventional and participation banks’
sources somewhat narrowed. By the time we reach the end of our sample in
April 2013, the ratio of demand deposits over current accounts declined to 12,
while the ratio of time deposits over participation accounts declined to 14. One
reason for the relative increase in the market share of participation banks could
be the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. The crisis triggered worries about
the stability of the banking system, which may have led to increased demand for
an alternative banking system such as Islamic banking. Indeed, it is noted that
Islamic banks generally have higher leverage ratios, and they have increased
their liquidity ratios during the recent financial crisis.45
To return to the VAR exercise, our goal in this exercise is to compare the
responses of conventional and participation banks to a monetary policy shock.
Three different scenarios are plausible: 1) If the customers of conventional
banks are more sensitive to relative rates of return, an increase in interest rate
leads to a larger decline in demand deposits relative to current accounts. 2) If
the customers of participation banks are more sensitive to relative rates of















45 Thorsten Beck, Aslı Demirgüç Kunt, and Ouarda Merrouche, “Islamic vs. Conventional Banking:
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return, an increase in interest rate leads to a larger decline in current accounts
relative to demand deposits. 3) If the customers of both types of bank
have similar sensitivities to rates of return, the decline in demand deposits
and current accounts should be comparable. Meanwhile, the change in time
deposits and participation accounts depends on the speed of adjustment of the
relative rates of return offered on these accounts in response to a change in
interest rates.
Figure 2 shows the results from the impulse response analysis of the twelve-
variable VAR model. The figure illustrates the responses of the variables to
a one standard deviation shock to the interest rate. In response to a tight
monetary policy action represented by the interest rate shock (the first panel),
demand for the Turkish lira goes up, which leads to a decline in the real
exchange rate (the second panel). As the interest rate shock diminishes, so does
its impact on the real exchange rate. Meanwhile, the tight monetary policy
action is associated with a decline in the price level in the second quarter
(the third panel), consistent with the monetary transmission mechanism where
a contractionary monetary policy puts downward pressure on the price level by
reducing aggregate demand.
The fourth and the fifth panels respectively show the response of liquid
assets to an interest rate shock for conventional banks (c_liquid_assets) and
participation banks (p_liquid_assets). We observe that liquid assets follow a
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U-shaped path following an interest rate shock, which is interpreted as
evidence for the existence of the bank lending channel.46 Bank loans are
contractual agreements and cannot be changed immediately in response to
a monetary policy action. Indeed, when there is a tight monetary policy
action that reduces the liquidity in the banking system, the immediate
response of the banking system is to increase its liquidity by selling off its
liquid assets. In the long run, however, banks reduce their loan portfolios
and bring back their liquid assets to their optimal level. In countries like
Turkey, where the financial system is heavily dependent on the banking
system, it is natural to expect a U-shape in liquid assets, which suggests that
the bank lending channel is effective.47
Two panels that are critical for the purposes of this study are the sixth and
the seventh panels, which trace the responses to an interest rate shock of
demand deposits at conventional banks and current accounts at participation
banks. Generally, both funding sources exhibit a decline in response to an
increase in interest rates, which is consistent with rational depositor behavior.
The increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the opportunity cost
of holding these accounts, leading the investors to search for alternative
instruments for their savings. The declines in the two funding sources are of
comparable magnitude, although depositors who hold demand deposits seem
to adjust somewhat faster than current account holders. Overall, we observe
that there is no significant difference in terms of the basic motivations of
customers in allocating their savings to low-yield instruments at the two types
of banks. Both types of customers consider the changes in relative rates of
return in making their optimal allocations.
The eighth and the ninth panels compare the responsiveness of time
deposits and participation accounts, both of which provide higher yields. If the
rates of return in these accounts competitively follow the interest rate change
induced by monetary policy, then these accounts may increase following a rate
hike.48 While both types of accounts exhibit an increase in the first month,
participation accounts display a significant decline around the third month,
suggesting that the profit shares in such accounts cannot be adjusted as fast
as interest rate adjustments in time deposits.
Figure 3 compares the interest rates offered on 12-month time deposits
with the profit shares distributed by participation banks. The top panel reflects
the fact that, even though average profit share is lower than rates offered on
46 Bernanke and Blinder, “The Federal Funds Rate,” 901–921.
47 See Selva Demiralp, “Parasal Aktarım Mekanizmasında,” 5–20.
48 See Seth Carpenter and Selva Demiralp, “Liquidity Effect at a Monthly Frequency,” Journal of Money,
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time deposits, the two rates of return follow the same general trend. Indeed,
when we test for cointegration between these two series, we find a significant
relationship (not shown). These findings are consistent with a free market
economy where profit shares are highly correlated with market interest rates;
indeed, for the interval from 2009 to 2011, the simple correlation coefficient
between the two series is 0.87. What is particularly important for our purposes
is how the changes in one series are followed by the other. For example, when
there is a change in 12-month interest rates, how long does it take for the profit
rates to follow? To answer that question, we construct the cross-correlations
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between the two series. Table 1 shows the lag and lead correlations between
changes in profit shares and changes in 12-month interest rates. Accordingly,
the maximum correlation between the two series takes place two months after a
change in 12-month interest rates; the correlation coefficient is 0.55. This
finding suggests that profit shares tend to change in the same direction as
interest rates, but likely with a two-month lag or longer.49 The slower
adjustment of profit shares is consistent with the contractual nature
of these agreements and explains the decline in participation accounts
following an increase in interest rates. The decline in the relative rate of
return leads to a decrease in such accounts, which is once again consistent
with rational investor behavior.
Panels ten and eleven of Figure 2 respectively show the response of bank
loans at conventional banks (c_loans) and participation banks (p_loans).
Following a tight monetary policy action, both types of bank loans decrease,
which is consistent with the bank lending channel. The decline in bank loans is
Table 1. Cross-correlations between profit shares and 12-month deposit rates
2009:01–2011:10.
Note: Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations. There are 33 observations.
D_PS is the monthly change in profit share, while D_12M is the monthly change in
12-month deposit rate.
49 Granger causality analysis (not shown) also indicate that 12-month deposit rates Granger cause profit
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only significant for conventional banks. This suggests that participation banks
may also be slow in adjusting the rates on their loans relative to conventional
banks. As a result, even though demand for loans at conventional banks
decreases in response to higher loan rates, demand for loans at participation
banks may not decline significantly if the costs of obtaining such loans does
not increase immediately. The last panel of Figure 2 shows the response of the
industrial production index, which declines following tight monetary policy,
which is consistent with the predictions of the monetary transmission
mechanism.
The analysis in this section suggests that there is no statistical difference in
the behavior of customers of the two types of bank in terms of searching for the
best rate of return for their savings.50 The observed differences between the
balance sheet components of the two types of bank mostly reflect the speed
of adjustment between the two banks, which is due to the structural
differences between the operations of the two types.
Before concluding this section, it is worth highlighting one interesting
aspect of Figure 3. While the rates of return offered by conventional banks
and Islamic banks follow the same general trend, as shown in the upper
panel, the difference between the two series widens over time, except for a
brief period in the last quarter of 2010. The lower panel plots the spread
between the average interest rate offered on 12-month deposits at conventional
banks and the average profit share at Islamic banks. The decline in deposit
rates in the last quarter of 2010 coincides with the announcement by the
Federal Reserve System regarding the second round of quantitative easing. It
would therefore be plausible to expect a decrease in deposit rates during
that time, following the increase in the risk appetite. Nevertheless, while
deposit rates sharply bounced back in early 2011, we do not observe a
similar increase in profit shares, which widens the spread between the rates of
return offered by the two types of banks. For this, there could be several
potential explanations that are consistent with the increase in the spread.
One explanation that is consistent with rational economic behavior is related to
the perceived riskiness of conventional banks, which increased over the
course of the financial crisis as these banks increased their exposure to
foreign currency borrowing. This may have led individuals to switch to
Islamic banks despite lower returns. Alternatively, it could be the case that the
customers of Islamic banks were becoming more religious and, hence, less
rational, and thus were willing to accept lower returns. Yet another plausibility
is the increase in the share of deposits held by government institutions


























in Islamic banks, which may have lowered the elasticities associated with
these accounts.51
The “interest” paradox among Islamic economic actors
It is widely assumed that Islamic economic actors’ main goal is to avoid
un-Islamic, interest-based gains and to finance an Islamic society.52 Never-
theless, the closer look taken at these actors’ investment and consumer
behavior in the previous section suggests that they are not indifferent to
pragmatic incentives and that they show sensitivity to interest rates.
When we shared our findings with Islamic bank managers, they typically
suggested that those account holders who are sensitive to interest rates and
leave Islamic banks during rate hikes constitute that minority of their customer
base who choose them in the first place not for religious reasons, but merely to
diversify their interests. However, devout individuals, their “true” customers,
would not shift their accounts elsewhere, regardless of changes in interest
rates.53 These comments reflect popular assumptions suggesting that Islamic
actors are categorically different from their non-Islamic counterparts and
behave according to purely ideological motives. We disagree with this
argument, because it is unlikely for the minority of Islamic bank customers to
drive the overall rational behavior that was documented in the previous
section. The analysis in the following section provides further evidence
against these popular assumptions.
While the previous section showed Islamic bank customers’ sensitivity to
interest rates through macro-level data, this section demonstrates at micro-level
that this sensitivity can also be observed among devout customers who prefer
Islamic banks for religous reasons. In this section, we present the results of our
interviews investigating the motivations of Islamic economic actors and analyze
how they respond to dilemmas that arise between religious convictions and
pragmatism. More specifically, we examine individuals’ sensitivity towards interest
payments in their financial transactions. The interviews analyze to what extent the
customers remain “loyal” to interest-free economic options and whether they are
likely to turn to other options if their economic interests dictate such moves.
The interviews were conducted with 104 individuals.54 The interviewees
were selected via snowball sampling, which is a preferable methodology in
order to establish a rapport between interviewee and interviewer when
51 The share of government institutions’ accounts in Islamic banks more than doubled from 2005
to 2013.
52 See Henry and Wilson, eds., The Politics of Islamic Finance.
53 Ahmet Tarık Tüzün, Head of Treasury, Kuveyt Türk, private interview, İstanbul, 2011.
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discussing topics as sensitive as ours.55 The questions, as shown in Table 2,
primarily investigated why the respondents chose to work with an Islamic
bank (i.e., for religious or other reasons), if they ever felt economically
disadvantaged during their experiences with Islamic banks, and if they
had or have had an additional account in a conventional bank. Other
questions included whether or not the interviewees possessed a credit card,
if they made payments through installments, whether they held stocks, and
whether they purchased government bonds.
Figure 4 summarizes the interview results, which suggest that a majority
(81.7 percent) of the customers prefer Islamic banks owing to religious
sensitivities; that is, in order to avoid “interest.” On the other hand, most inter-
viewees (78 percent) do not feel economically disadvantaged in doing business
with Islamic banks. This is consistent with the findings presented in the previous
section, where it was documented that profit rates are typically in sync with
interest rates such that, most of the time, customers do not face a dilemma
between religious and economic preferences. However, the majority (71 percent)
of the customers who specifically mentioned that they had chosen Islamic banks
for religious reasons also admitted that they already held an account in a
conventional bank, or at least that they had one at some point, for such practical
reasons as ATM accessibility or advantageous payment opportunities.
The individuals’ attitudes towards installment payments and credit cards
also offer interesting findings on actors’ sensitivity towards the notion of
interest payments. In Turkey, many stores offer their customers the option to
pay on installment in exchange for a higher total price. This creates a dilemma
for devout consumers, because most Islamic authorities describe this type of
payment as another form of interest. Moreover, installment payments typically
Table 2. Interview questions used to evaluate actors’ sensitivity toward “interest
aversion”.
Question Question Wording
1. Why did you chose to work with an Islamic bank?
2. Do you ever feel economically disadvantaged while working with an Islamic bank?
3. Do you have an additional account in a conventional bank, or have you had one in the past?
4. Do you use a credit card?
5. Do you make payments through installments?
6. Do you purchase stocks?
7. Do you purchase government bonds?
55 In addition to the aforementioned advantages, there are also downsides to snowball sampling, such

























involve credit card use. However, credit cards, even when offered by Islamic banks,
raise questions regarding their compatibility with Islamic principles.
Islamic banks avoid interest, but they do charge for “delayed payment” of debt. For
some scholars, though, this type of a charge is no different from an interest rate.
Even so, 75 percent of our interviewees noted that they chose to make payments on
installment, typically using a credit card and even when there was a higher price for
the purchase. Despite their religious concerns, the actors turned towards this
option owing to the economic disadvantages of making the entire payment up
front, as well as to the absence of alternative Islamic payment options.56
In sum, the interviews provide supporting evidence to our findings in the
VAR exercise, suggesting that the customers of Islamic banks can simulta-
neously be both religious and pragmatic. While they seek to unite both Islamic
and economic interests, they may choose one over the other when they fail to
fulfill both. Islamic banks are often able to harmonize religious and pragmatic
preferences and thereby decrease the pressure on individuals to choose between
the two options. However, when such dilemmas do occur, individuals act as
rational agents and make their choices by taking the opportunity costs into
account. They remain loyal to Islamic banks when other alternatives are not
economically superior, yet they consider shifting their investments when the
other options become significantly more advantageous.
Conclusion
This study has observed the behavior of Islamic bank customers and analyzed
the impact of religious commitment on their economic decisions. In particular,
Figure 4: Interest aversion among Islamic bank customers.
56 Due to the large number of “no response” answer to questions on stock and bond holdings, we
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we have investigated the extent of “interest aversion” among Islamic economic
actors when faced with a dilemma between religious and pragmatic preferences.
To this end, we provided a comparison of Islamic and conventional banks
around the workings of the bank lending channel.
Our findings suggest that there are no statistically significant differences
between the sensitivities or the economic rationalities of the customers of the
two types of bank. As our interviews also confirm, devout individuals prefer
Islamic banks so long as they provide competitive gains, but that they may
consider alternative investments or economic transactions when those offer
superior advantages.
Our analysis allowed for an empirical testing of the assumptions regarding
Islamist actors based on “Islamic exceptionalism.” Our research, specifically
based on the case of Turkey, demonstrates firstly that Islamic economic actors
do not constitute a monolithic entity. Secondly, just like their counterparts,
many Islamic individuals weigh their ideological and pragmatic preferences
before making a choice. They try to follow Islamic principles when these
overlap with their pragmatic interests, but they are open to reconsidering their
choices when their religious and economic interests diverge. Finally, this
adaptive rationality has politico-economic implications suggesting that Islamic
actors can become part of liberal systems. We believe that this is an important
finding that should be investigated further by future studies that might bring
additional evidence on an individual level.
Finally, there are two more important questions that deserve further
discussion. First, is there a monetary threshold that determines the effective-
ness of the aforementioned economic incentives? More specifically, are actors
are more likely to respond to incentives above a certain level of opportunity
cost? Second, does income level impact actors’ likelihood to respond to
economic incentives? In other words, are wealthier people more likely to
deviate from their commitment to interest-free banking because their stakes are
higher? Or does wealth, at least at a certain minimum, make actors more
economically satisfied and, thus, more indifferent to economic incentives?
These issues are outside of the scope of our current analysis and require
further research.
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